Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

1995

Business Lawyers and Value Creation for Clients
Ronald J. Gilson
Columbia Law School, rgilson@law.columbia.edu

Robert H. Mnookin

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Business Lawyers and Value Creation for Clients, 74 OR. L. REV. 1
(1995).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/899

This Foreword is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu.

OREGON

LAW
REVIEW

Spring 1995

VOLUME 74
NUMBER 1

Symposium on
Business Lawyering and
Value Creation for Clients
RONALD J. GILSON*
ROBERT H. MNOOKIN**

Foreword: Business Lawyers and

Value Creation for Clients
HIS Symposium marks an important milestone in legal
scholarship and education: The spotlight falls on business
lawyers for a change. Ten years ago, when one of us first wrote
about what business lawyers really do,' no one had devoted
much attention to this part of the profession. In his broadside
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against lawyers, Derek Bok, then President of Harvard University and formerly dean of its law school, reserved his invective for
litigators and the litigation process.2 Business lawyers captured
the attention of very few critics; even on the unusual occasion
when we were noticed, the criticism was at least funny. If the
litigators got Shakespeare's incitement to legacide, we got Kurt
Vonnegut. Some of you may remember Vonnegut's primer on
the lawyer as transaction cost engineer, in which a popular law
professor tells his students that to get ahead in the practice of law
"a lawyer should be looking for situations where large amounts
of money are about to change hands." 3 Give Vonnegut credithe saw the central importance of a transactional focus only a few
years after Coase.4 Vonnegut goes on:
In every big transaction [the professor said], there is a magic
moment during which a man has surrendered a treasure, and
during which the man who is due to receive it has not yet done
so. An alert lawyer will make that moment his own, possessing the treasure for a magic microsecond, taking a little of it,
passing it on. If the man who is to receive the treasure is unused to wealth, has an inferiority complex and shapeless feelings of guilt, as most people do, the lawyer can often take as
much as half the bundle, and still receive the recipient's blubbering thanks.5
Now compare the articles that comprise this issue of the Oregon Law Review. Karl Okamoto, for example, considers the importance of reputation in business practice;6 Ed Bernstein, a
practicing business lawyer, approaches contract drafting from a
value creation perspective;7 and Robert Thompson extends the
transaction cost engineer paradigm to include failures in cognition.' And just as there are lessons for practice in these pages, so
too are there lessons for pedagogy: A value creation focus can
2 Derek Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice and Training, reprinted in 33 J.
LEG. EDUC. 570 (1983).
3 KURT VONNEGUT, GOD BLESS You MRS. ROSEWATER 17-18 (1965).
4 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
5 VOrNNEGUT, supra note 3, at 17-18.
6 Karl S.Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, 74 OR. L. REv. 15

(1995).
7 Edward Bernstein, Law & Economics and the Structure of Value Adding Contracts: A Contract Lawyer's View of the Law & Economics Literature, 74 OR. L.
REV. 189 (1995).
8 Robert B. Thompson, Value Creation by Lawyers Within Relational Contracts
and in Noisy Environments, 74 OR. L. REv. 315 (1995).
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help legal academics do a better job of teaching students how to
be business lawyers.
We intend to take advantage of having the first word in these
proceedings by dropping the cloak of academic neutrality to
proselytize shamelessly for the approach this Symposium highlights. At a time when lawyers have come to doubt the professional conception of their calling, the self-confidence that grows
out of a focus on value creation may provide a much needed
counterweight. As our own contribution, we want to provide the
substantive foundation for that self-confidence by highlighting
the parallel intellectual development of two intrinsically linked
themes still commonly treated as separate: transaction cost theory as a guide to creating value, and negotiation theory as a
guide to understanding the process by which the value created is
divided.
We have always known that value creation and value division
are central to what business lawyers do, but we lacked the theory
to make positive or normative statements about either the activities or their relation. Over the last ten to fifteen years, developing theory has created the potential for both scholarship and
pedagogy in this area. Transaction cost economics, agency theory
and finance have illuminated the value creation element of business lawyering. Game theory, cognitive psychology and social
psychology have done the same for value division. And rational
expectations theory has demonstrated the link between the two:
expectations of how the value created will be divided influence
the likelihood that it will be created in the first place. At this
point, the link between our two points appears: The ability to
harness theory to improve practice provides a solid foundation
for renewed professional confidence.
I
BUSINESS LAWYERING AND PROFESSIONALISM

Bemoaning a decline in the professionalism of lawyers has become commonplace in recent years. Sol Linowitz and Mary Ann
Glendon have offered book length treatments,9 and the law re9 MARY
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view literature is enormous. 10 But for our purposes here, Tony
Kronman, the dean of the Yale Law School, frames the issue
most directly. In The Lost Lawyer, Dean Kronman describes a
profession "in danger of losing its soul,"" for him the spiritual
coupling of intelligence and character epitomized by the "lawyerstatesman." The specter is of future generations of legal janissaries who possess large measures of intelligence, skills and loyalty, but who lack the commitment to integrate those traits into
broader conceptions of the wise or the good. In Kronman's analysis, attorneys lose the practical wisdom resulting from this integration and consequently the distinguishing characteristic of the
lawyer-statesman and the highest aspirations of the bar.
For this Symposium, the important part of Dean Kronman's
account is less the model of professionalism the lawyer-statesman
represents than the analysis of the cause of the decay.' 2 Here
Kronman's account shares a common ground with some other
recent accounts-the analysis remains largely legal centric, embracing an unremitting belief that the profession itself controls
the operative conditions of its own professionalism.' 3 Kronman
acknowledges changes in the character of the demand for legal
services, in particular the growing professionalization of clients.' 4
But he contends that the real culprit lies within the profession
and, more specifically and surprisingly, within the law schools,
especially the elite law schools. We part company with Dean
10 The literature is well surveyed in the collection of essays appearing in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRAcricEs: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL

PROFESSION (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992). We-confess to having added something to the volume of this debate. See Ronald Gilson & Robert Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94
COLUM. L. REv. 509 (1994); Ronald Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession:
A Demand Side Perspective, 49 MD. L. REv. 869 (1990).
11 ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LosT LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL

PROFESSION 1 (1993).

12 Others have challenged the lawyer-statesman construct directly. See James M.
Altman, Modem Litigators and Lawyer-Statesmen, 103 YALE L.J. 1031 (1994);
David B. Wilkins, PracticalWisdom for PracticingLawyers: Separating Ideals from
Ideology in Legal Ethics, 108 HARv.L. REv. 458 (1994).
13 The American Bar Association's exhortation to renewal illustrates the problem.
See ABA Comm. on Professionalism, In the Spiritof Public Service: A Blueprintfor
Rekindling, reprintedin 112 F.R.D. 243 (1986).
14 KRONMAN, supra note 11, at 276. We do not come to this issue without preconceptions. Both Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 10, and Gilson, supra note 10, advance the thesis that the principle agent of change is on the demand side of the
market for legal services, in particular the dramatic reduction in the information
asymmetry between lawyer and client that, in the past, accounted for the market
power which sheltered much of the behavior we associate with professionalism.
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5
Kronman on this causation issue.'
So who kidnapped the lost lawyer? The law schools! The villain in Dean Kronman's mystery is the change in substance and
pedagogy that has occurred in legal education-the displacement
of traditional case analysis by both law and economics and critical legal studies. 6 To summarize (which does justice neither to
the skill with which Dean Kronman deploys the argument nor to
its gossamer quality), case analysis forces students to immerse
themselves deeply both in the facts of a case and in dissecting the
legal rules by which the court links those facts to a normatively
appropriate outcome. The repeated discipline of developing normative principles only through confronting the complexities of
real life hones the attribute of practical wisdom: Lawyers learn
to craft imperfect but workable solutions to problems whose
complexity defies perfection. When turned loose upon the world
after law school, lawyers end up in charge in just those circumstances where practical wisdom is necessary; lawyer-statesmen
thrive on the uncertainty inherent in ascertaining the appropriate
normative principles to be applied to complicated, institutionally
contingent problems.
Dean Kronman believes this skill, which marks the lawyerstatesman (and which, we note, bears passing resemblance to the
current resurgence in pragmatism), is the casualty of the increasing dominance of a social science orientation in law schoolswhether grounded in neoclassical economics or European sociology. Both law and economics and critical legal studies, Kronman
argues, are ultimately reductionist: Each abstracts away complexity in favor of simple theorems. Students thereby lose the
discipline of having to account, positively or normatively, for the
institutional detail that honed the practical wisdom of Dean
Kronman's lawyer-statesman.
Viewing the past through the nostalgic shimmer of time masks
many of its blemishes. 7 Consider instead a different account of

We should temper our criticism of the analysis by acknowledging our respect
for the effort. Rarely have we so admired the motivation and sincerity of an inquiry
whose conclusion we so fundamentally disagreed.
with
16
See KRONMAN, supra note 11, at 225-64.
17 Robert Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REv. 1, 2-6 (1988),
demonstrates this point in connection with the recurrent phenomenon of each generation of legal literature announcing the decline of professionalism. An eighty year
old quote from Louis Brandeis illustrates Gordon's point:
It is true that at the present time the lawyer does not hold as high a position with the people as held seventy-five or indeed fifty years ago; but the
15
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the relation between the case method and practical wisdom. In
any law school class, only a fraction of the students possesses
judgment when they graduate and we are skeptical whether the
law school experience accounts for even this fraction. Indeed, we
suspect that some students come to law school with practical wisdom already in hand and may well have had it when they were
twelve years old. To be sure, the case method effectively poses
the problem for the large number of less favorably endowed students: How does the lawyer find the normative needle in the
haystack of factually complex settings? But it gives no guidance
concerning what to do then. At its extreme, the case method
provides lawyers with the analytic tools to spot problems, but not
the skills to solve them.' 8 And this ability to spot issues but not
necessarily solve problems gives rise to the perception that lawyers are deal killers who highlight so many unresolvable issues
that the transaction ultimately collapses. The reductionism of
early law and economics and critical legal studies seems to us an
understandable reaction to the case method's core problem in
training lawyers. Ultimately, both ends of the law school ideological spectrum railed at the case method's indeterminacy.
For us, the excitement of this conference is the potential that
the various methodologies canvassed hold for teaching just those
things that Dean Kronman's idealized case method never didthat is, the bundle of skills that he collectively calls practical wisdom. Transaction cost economics, the economics of information,
the positive theory of agency, and the theoretical basis of negotiation share a common goal-to understand the complexity of
transactions and institutions by focusing on their imperfections.
We can teach contracting techniques that mitigate the pervasive
information asymmetries between the contracting parties which
stand as a barrier to almost every transaction. We can teach how
issue is not lack of opportunity. It is this: ... [L]awyers have, to a large
extent, allowed themselves to become adjuncts of great corporations and
have neglected the obligation to use their powers as for the protection of
people.
Louis Brandeis, The Opportunity in Law, in BusINEss-A PROFESSION 329, 337
(1933) (reprinting 1914 speech).
18 It is a closer question whether the argument also is founded on hubris--can any
technique of law school pedagogy really have the socializing force that Kronman
assigns the case method? Here, however, we share his belief in the transformative
power of professional pedagogy; it is, after all, the lever of influence on which we
rely as well. Of course, that does not resolve the question of hubris one way or
another.
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attention to the availability of market remedies-for example,
the role of reputation and the promise of future dealings-may
provide alternatives to costly and ineffective litigation remedies.19 We can teach how incentive structures can be fashioned
to minimize the trade-off between risk sharing and incentives.2"
We can teach how decision theory can help focus what issues really affect a transaction's outcome. To the extent law schools can
teach these skills-and the articles contained in this issue and our
own experience hold out that promise 21-then we will do a far
better job than the case method purveyors of Dean Kronman's
golden age could ever have imagined. We will send out from law
school more students with judgment than just those who arrived
already possessing it. And if the changing character of the demand for legal services has compromised a lawyer's autonomy,22
then a new opportunity to perfect our craft provides a foundation
for building professionalism in the new environment in which we
find ourselves.
II
VALUE CREATION AND VALUE DIVISION

That brings us to our second point-examining more concretely how theoretical advances from the social sciences give
credence to our claim both that we now have the knowledge to
teach judgment and that lawyers are particularly well-placed to
accomplish it. As a vehicle we will use the new understanding of
the relation between value creation and value division.
We are committed to the notion that lawyers can often create
value, not just as business lawyers who serve as transaction cost
19 Bernstein, supra note 7, provides an interesting account of how the deficiencies
of litigation remedies shape the structure of transactions.
20 PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MAN-

AGEMENT ch. 7 (1991), provides an approach to this problem that we have found
useful in teaching from a transactional perspective. It is a different puzzle to explain
why Dean Kronman, who certainly knows the literature, ignored the new institutionalism of recent law and economics, highlighted by the award of the Nobel Prize in
Economic Science to Ronald Coase, in his analysis of the impact of law and economics on law school pedagogy. The Lost Lawyer's index, for example, includes only
one passing reference to the work of Oliver Williamson.
21 This is our goal in developing negotiation courses at Harvard and "deals"
courses at Stanford and Columbia that seek to harness sophisticated theory to the
task of teaching professional skills.
22 See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 10; Gilson, supra note 10. In this respect,

the professions stand together. Physicians and public accountants seem to us to be
further along the path dictated by increasing client sophistication.
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engineers,23 but also as litigators who cooperate to facilitate efficient dispute resolution,' and as process architects who design
25
efficient systems to resolve conflict outside of court at low cost.
But we are not naive enough to believe that lawyers-even the
business lawyers whose virtues are celebrated in this Symposium-necessarily accomplish these goals. Indeed, the purpose
of our Foreword is to explain why this is so and how the social
sciences (Dean Kronman notwithstanding) can provide valuable
insights both to practicing lawyers and legal academics.
To understand why lawyers may or may not end up creating
value, it is necessary to understand (1) the sources of the value
creation, and (2) the negotiation process through which value
may or may not be created, and the barriers that may sometimes
lead to negotiation failures. Because we have each written about
these issues in more detail elsewhere, our summary here will be
26
very abbreviated.
We begin with the sources of value creation. Economic theory
provides a useful framework for understanding the basic
sources-the raw materials-from which value can potentially be
created by transaction cost engineers. These sources relate to:
(1) differences; (2) non-competitive similarities; (3) economies of
scale and scope; and (4) developing structures for dampening
27
strategic opportunism and reducing transaction costs.
The first, and perhaps most general, source of value creation
relates to differences between the parties. Students in negotiation courses often erroneously believe that win-win negotiations
somehow depend on finding similarities-common interests
shared by both sides. In fact, it is characteristically differences in
preferences, relative valuations, predictions about the future, and
risk preferences that fuel value-creating opportunities. The basic
principle is fundamental to economics: Trade should occur-and
surplus can be created-when one party places a high relative
value on a good or service that the other party values less highly.
23 See Gilson, supra note 1.
24
Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 10.
25 Beyond Litigation: An Interview with Robert H. Mnookin, STANFORD LAW.,
Spring/Summer 1989, at 45.
26 See Gilson, supra note 1; Robert Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fai" An Exploration of Barriersto the Resolution of Conflict, 8 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 235
(1993); BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION (K. Arrow et al. eds., 1995).
27 See ROBERT MNOOKIN ET AL., A GENERAL THEORY OF NEGOTIATION (forthcoming 1996); DAVID LAx & JAMES SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR ch.

2 (1986).
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For example, a vegetarian with a chicken and a carnivore with a
large vegetable garden will find it useful to swap what they have
for what they don't have. Because substantial barriers exist to
direct trade of unlike commodities,28 lawyers can add value by
creating the structures by which these differences can be
arbitraged.
A second source of value creation is non-competitive similarities. Public finance theory has long taught that police protection,
national defense, and clean air all represent economic goods in
which more for the Smiths does not necessarily mean less for the
Joneses. In some instances, the interests and preferences of parties to a negotiation may be such that each may enjoy added benefits without diminishing the other's enjoyment. For example, a
divorcing mother and father may both derive benefits from their
child's emotional well-being and educational achievements.29
Establishing a good working relationship is another example of
non-competitive similarities: Improving communication between
business partners will characteristically benefit both partners.
Economies of scale or scope-in both production and consumption-provide the third category of value-creating opportunities. Many economic transactions in which lawyers play a
critical role involve pooling the production or consumption facilities of different parties so that the unit cost will drop as a function of increasing volume or range of activities. Creating or
preserving the structures that capture such economies is an important source of value creation.
The fourth source of value creation relates closely to recent
work in transaction cost and agency economics. Lawyers can
often play a role in creating incentive structures that dampen the
potential for opportunistic behavior. This is not to say that the
problems of asymmetric information, adverse selection, and
moral hazard can be vanquished from the world through good
lawyering. It is, however, a matter of degree; lawyers can often
create procedures and institutional structures that diminish the
risks by either minimizing asymmetries or aligning incentives.3 °
These sources often provide the potential for lawyers to struc28 See, e.g., Yoram Barzel, Measurement Costs and the Organization of Markets,
25 J. L. & ECON. 27 (1982).
29 See ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKN, DIVIDING THE CHILD:
SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 52-53 (1992).
30
See MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 20.

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74, 1995]

ture transactions that create value. But that potential must be
realized through a process, and that process is typically negotiation. Descriptively, business lawyers spend a good deal of their
time engaged in negotiation. Moreover, whether lawyers in a
particular transaction in fact succeed in creating value depends
importantly upon their negotiation skills. That value creation
typically occurs through negotiation poses two risks. First, the
negotiation process itself can sometimes be so costly and time
consuming that the potential surplus is dissipated even though
the transaction is completed. Alternatively, the negotiation process may fail entirely, so that no transaction is consummated
even though the potential to create value existed. These risks
result from the barriers to successful negotiation that arise in just
those circumstances where negotiation has the potential to create
value. The rub lies in the fact that the process of negotiation
both creates the value and distributes it among the parties involved: A client hires a lawyer not simply to enlarge the pie, but
also to maximize the size of her slice.
Sketching the outlines of a few of the potential barriers to
value creation through negotiation provides a useful introduction
to the problem.31 In light of Dean Kronman's discomfort with
the growing role of social science in law schools, we think it significant that our understanding of these barriers has greatly
benefitted from important research across several social science
disciplines. A review of four potential barriers illustrates this basic claim.
The first-what one of us has characterized as a strategic barrier 32-is inherent in the very process of negotiation. Each
party's desire to claim as much value as possible for herself may
inhibit or prevent the cooperation necessary to value creation.
Lax and Sebenius have characterized this tension as the "negotiator's dilemma.13 3 When negotiators structure a deal that creates value, the result is to enlarge a pie that must be divided; but
who gets what size slice also must be resolved. All negotiations
thus inevitably involve questions of distribution. And practitioners will express no surprise at the fact that clients often may care
more about the size of the slice than the size of the pie. Econo31 These ideas are developed in more detail in Mnookin, supra note 26, and Robert Mnookin & Lee Ross, Introduction, inBARRIERS TO CoNFCLicr RESOLUTION,
supra note 26, at 2.
32 See Mnookin, supra note 26.
33 See LAX & SEBENrUS, supra note 27.
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mists have long observed that an individual client may prefer
points beneath a Pareto-frontier to many outcomes on the
frontier.
An important source of this tension between value creation
and value division relates to information asymmetries. Value
creation characteristically requires parties to honestly share their
private information so that they can fully identify and exploit differences in relative valuation, opportunities for non-competitive
similarities or scale or scope economies, or the possibility to align
incentives. The basic difficulty is that honestly sharing information exposes a party to the risk that the other party may behave
strategically. Hence, a dilemma. In order to create value, a party
may wish to be open himself and encourage the other side to be
open as well. Disclosure that one party prefers apples and the
other oranges creates the potential for value-creating trade. But
the fear of exploitation may make each party reluctant to disclose to the other information that is critical to value creation.
Once one side discloses that she prefers the other's apples to her
oranges, the apple holder may strategically misrepresent her
taste for oranges to influence the terms of the trade.'
Even in the absence of information asymmetries, strategic behavior over division may interfere with actually creating the
gains. Parties may be tempted to use threats and various commitment strategies to claim for themselves the lion's share of the
gains from cooperation. If both parties engage in such hard bargaining, the result may be no deal at all, or so long and conflictual a negotiation process that a large portion of the potential
surplus is wasted.35
A second barrier will be familiar to those readers with some
exposure to recent work concerning principal/agent problems.
The economic literature on agency, and scholarship relating to
transaction cost economics, teaches that an agent's incentives
cannot be perfectly aligned with those of her principal. Using an
agent allows the principal the benefits of the agent's special
knowledge, skills, and resources. However, the interests of an
agent negotiating on behalf of a principal may be a barrier to
reaching an agreement that would benefit the principal. For example, critics often claim that litigators are themselves a barrier
to the efficient resolution of business disputes through early set34 See Mnookin, supra note 26.
35 See id.
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tlement. High discovery costs surely contribute to the income of
partners in many large American defense law firms. Similarly,
the fact that plaintiffs' lawyers paid on contingency largely bear
the costs of trial surely leads to some settlements that are not in
the clients' interests.36
Business lawyers can also be villains in some principal/agent
stories. Like the target company executives who see themselves
at risk if a hostile take-over succeeds, a lawyer who will lose an
important client if a merger succeeds may sometimes stand in the
way of an acquisition that would substantially benefit his client.
None of this is to deny that lawyers-and agents generally-contribute substantially to value creation. We simply wish to underline that agents often may be conflicted, with the result that less
value is created.
Strategic barriers, and those resulting from principal/agent issues, reflect models of human behavior premised on rational,
self-interested parties seeking to maximize their own interests.
Other barriers, our understanding of which grows out of pathbreaking scholarship in psychology, are based on different behavioral models. These barriers arise because parties are subject to
psychological processes that sometimes render them unable to
recognize as advantageous agreements or settlements that really
are in their rational self-interest. To make matters even worse,
psychological barriers may exacerbate the effect of strategic barriers. As one of us has written, "[b]asic cognitive and motivational processes do in fact create barriers to dispute resolution
that augment and interact with barriers arising from strategic calculation."37 Psychological blinders may so shrink the perceived
opportunity for value creation that even small amounts of strategic behavior overwhelm the process.
This is not the place to attempt an exhaustive summary of
these psychological barriers. But we can point to a number of
cognitive processes-such as "optimistic overconfidence" (relating to the fact that uncalibrated assessments of probability are
often more extreme than the assessors' knowledge can justify),
"loss aversion" (relating to our tendency to care more about
avoiding a loss than securing an equivalent gain), as well as difficulties arising from the heuristics that are used by people to evaluate uncertainty-which interfere with effective negotiation by
36 See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 10.
37 Mnookin & Ross, supra note 31, at 2.
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parties, let alone those acting
even well-intentioned
38
strategically.
In addition to barriers that relate to how human beings process
information, there are also social-psychological barriers. Lee
Ross has identified a barrier that he called "reactive devaluation." Ross's research suggests that particularly where negotiators view each other as adversaries-that is, when dividing the
value created looms large in the parties' minds-they devalue
concessions offered by the other side simply because of their
source. As Ross has written: "To the extent that adversaries devalue the compromises and concessions put on the table by the
other side, they exacerbate an already difficult dilemma: that of
forging an agreement that the relevant parties with their differing
views of history and their differing views of entitlement, will perceive to be better than the status quo and not offensive to their
sense of equity."3 9
This brief review of four different types of barriers is meant
simply to underline a fundamental point: While lawyers may
often play a very constructive role in creating value, value can
only be created through a process-characteristically negotiation-that may sometimes fail. It is also meant to suggest that at
a very deep level Dean Kronman was badly mistaken when he
argued that the insights of social sciences have subverted the
legal profession and the legal academy. The cadre of lawyerstatesmen whom Kronman venerates-composed of those students who came to golden age law school with judgment already
in hand-intuitively saw the opportunities to create value and
sensed the barriers to successful negotiation that stood in the
way. We believe that creative use of the insights of the social
sciences holds the potential to raise the rest of us to that level, a
result that can only increase the professionalism of the bar, both
in its public contribution and in the satisfaction of craft it can
provide its members.
As this Symposium and our remarks suggest, the insights of
the social sciences also create special opportunities for legal
scholars. In many respects, legal academics are particularly well
suited to the interdisciplinary effort necessary to exploring how
38 See Daniel Khaneman & Amos Tversky, Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive Perspective, in BARRIERS TO CoNFLicr RESoLUriON, supra note 26, at 44.
39
Lee Ross, Reactive Devaluationin Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, in BAR-

RIERS TO CoNFLIcr RESOLUTION, supra note 26, at 33.

14
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our legal system, and private parties transacting in its shadow,
behave. To the extent that legal academics share a common disciplinary core beyond facility with the output of courts and legislatures, it is a commitment to the importance of a deep and
sensitive institutional knowledge. However, as legal scholars we
are reasonably free of disciplinary restrictions on the tools that
can be deployed in aid of our task. Legal academics may take
economic analysis as far as it goes, but then switch to cognitive
psychology or sociology to fully close the jaws of our analytic
vice. In this respect, we have the opportunity to use borrowed
concepts and apply them with a freedom that our sisters and
brothers in particular social science disciplines probably cannot.
We salute this Symposium and the University of Oregon School
of Law for encouraging this sort of work. In the end, it holds
more promise than a return to what Langdell incorrectly called
the science of law.

